Research in decision theory: A personal perspective

[1]  P. Fishburn.  Dominance in SSB utility theory , 1984 .

[2]  Peter C. Fishburn,et al.  Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons , 1983 .

[3]  P. Fishburn.  Transitive measurable utility , 1983 .

[4]  Peter C. Fishburn,et al.  Paradoxes of Preferential Voting , 1983 .

[5]  S. Chew.  A Generalization of the Quasilinear Mean with Applications to the Measurement of Income Inequality and Decision Theory Resolving the Allais Paradox , 1983 .

[6]  W. Gehrlein.  Condorcet's paradox , 1983 .

[7]  M. Machina.  "Expected Utility" Analysis without the Independence Axiom , 1982 .

[8]  G. Shafer.  Bayes's Two Arguments for The Rule of Conditioning , 1982 .

[9]  Robert L. Winkler.  State of the Art: RESEARCH DIRECTIONS IN DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY* , 1982 .

[10]  David E. Bell,et al.  Regret in Decision Making under Uncertainty , 1982, Oper. Res..

[11]  T. Fine,et al.  Towards a Frequentist Theory of Upper and Lower Probability , 1982 .

[12]  H. Kunreuther,et al.  Decision Making: SOURCES OF BIAS IN ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES FOR UTILITY FUNCTIONS , 1982 .

[13]  P. Fishburn.  Nontransitive measurable utility , 1982 .

[14]  R. McKelvey,et al.  Implementation of Democratic Social Choice Functions , 1982 .

[15]  Charles R. Plott,et al.  Committee decisions under alternative procedural rules: An experimental study applying a new non-monetary method of preference inducement , 1982 .

[16]  Peter C. Fishburn,et al.  Majority efficiencies for simple voting procedures: Summary and interpretation , 1982 .

[17]  Stephen M. Stigler,et al.  Thomas Bayes's Bayesian Inference , 1982 .

[18]  Hervé Moulin,et al.  Voting with Proportional Veto Power , 1982 .

[19]  Richard G. Niemi,et al.  Sophisticated Voting under the Plurality Procedure , 1982 .

[20]  A. Tversky,et al.  The Psychology of Preferences , 1982 .

[21]  The structure of exactly strongly consistent social choice functions , 1981 .

[22]  P. Fishburn.  Subjective expected utility: A review of normative theories , 1981 .

[23]  D. Granberg,et al.  Perceptions of Issue Positions of Presidential Candidates , 1980 .

[24]  A. Tversky,et al.  Prospect Theory : An Analysis of Decision under Risk Author ( s ) : , 2007 .

[25]  H. Moulin.  Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes , 1979 .

[26]  P. Fishburn,et al.  TWO‐PIECE VON NEUMANN‐MORGENSTERN UTILITY FUNCTIONS* , 1979 .

[27]  R. McKelvey.  General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models , 1979 .

[28]  Pradeep Dubey,et al.  Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index , 1979, Math. Oper. Res..

[29]  T. Groves,et al.  Efficient Collective Choice when Compensation is Possible , 1979 .

[30]  E. Maskin,et al.  The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility , 1979 .

[31]  A. Tversky,et al.  Prospect theory: analysis of decision under risk , 1979 .

[32]  C. Plott.  The Application of Laboratory Experimental Methods to Public Choice , 1979 .

[33]  M. Allais,et al.  The So-Called Allais Paradox and Rational Decisions under Uncertainty , 1979 .

[34]  Jeffrey T. Richelson,et al.  A comparative-analysis of social choice functions, I, II, III: A summary , 1979 .

[35]  K. MacCrimmon,et al.  Utility Theory: Axioms Versus ‘Paradoxes’ , 1979 .

[36]  Michael X Cohen,et al.  Toward Applicable Social Choice Theory: A Comparison of Social Choice Functions under Spatial Model Assumptions , 1978, American Political Science Review.

[37]  Peter C. Fishburn,et al.  Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof , 1978 .

[38]  H. Young,et al.  A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle , 1978 .

[39]  R. McKelvey,et al.  A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures , 1978 .

[40]  J. Kelly.  Arrow Impossibility Theorems , 1978 .

[41]  L. Gevers,et al.  Leximin and utilitarian rules: A joint characterization , 1978 .

[42]  C. Plott,et al.  A Model of Agenda Influence on Committee Decisions , 1978 .

[43]  H. P. Young,et al.  The allocation of funds in lobbying and campaigning , 1978 .

[44]  Bhaskar Dutta,et al.  On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems , 1978 .

[45]  Bezalel Peleg,et al.  CONSISTENT VOTING SYSTEMS , 1978 .

[46]  Bhaskar Dutta,et al.  Strategy and group choice , 1978 .

[47]  Gerald H. Kramer,et al.  A dynamical model of political equilibrium , 1977 .

[48]  V. Smith.  The Principle of Unanimity and Voluntary Consent in Social Choice , 1977, Journal of Political Economy.

[49]  P. Fishburn.  Condorcet Social Choice Functions , 1977 .

[50]  Peter C. Fishburn,et al.  Behavioral Models of Risk Taking in Business Decisions: A Survey and Evaluation , 1977 .

[51]  R. Niemi,et al.  The Choice of Voting Systems , 1976 .

[52]  R. McKelvey.  Policy Related Voting and Electoral Equilibrium , 1975 .

[53]  H. Young.  Social Choice Scoring Functions , 1975 .

[54]  M. Satterthwaite.  Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions , 1975 .

[55]  H. P. Young,et al.  An axiomatization of Borda's rule , 1974 .

[56]  P. Fishburn.  Paradoxes of Voting , 1974, American Political Science Review.

[57]  John W. Payne,et al.  Alternative approaches to decision making under risk: Moments versus risk dimensions. , 1973 .

[58]  J. H. Smith.  AGGREGATION OF PREFERENCES WITH VARIABLE ELECTORATE , 1973 .

[59]  A. Gibbard.  Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result , 1973 .

[60]  G. C. Tiao,et al.  Bayesian inference in statistical analysis , 1973 .

[61]  P. Fishburn.  The Theory Of Social Choice , 1973 .

[62]  Gerald H. Kramer,et al.  Sophisticated voting over multidimensional choice spaces , 1972 .

[63]  P. Fishburn.  Mathematics of decision theory , 1972 .

[64]  R. L. Winkler.  An Introduction to Bayesian Inference and Decision , 1972 .

[65]  A. Sen,et al.  Collective Choice and Social Welfare , 2017 .

[66]  M. Degroot.  Optimal Statistical Decisions , 1970 .

[67]  M. Hinich,et al.  An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process , 1970, American Political Science Review.

[68]  Peter C. Fishburn,et al.  Utility theory for decision making , 1970 .

[69]  Robin Farquharson,et al.  Theory of voting , 1969 .

[70]  Robert H. Wilson.  An Axiomatic Model of Logrolling , 1969 .

[71]  Y. Murakami.  Logic and Social Choice , 1968 .

[72]  K. Arrow,et al.  Aspects of the theory of risk-bearing , 1966 .

[73]  E. Kauder.  History of Marginal Utility Theory , 1965 .

[74]  J. Pratt.  RISK AVERSION IN THE SMALL AND IN THE LARGE11This research was supported by the National Science Foundation (grant NSF-G24035). Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of the United States Government. , 1964 .

[75]  Ward Edwards,et al.  Bayesian statistical inference for psychological research. , 1963 .

[76]  Robert Schlaifer.  Introduction to statistics for business decisions , 1963 .

[77]  William H. Flanigan,et al.  The Theory of Political Coalitions. , 1965 .

[78]  James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock.  The Calculus of Consent , 1962 .

[79]  Howard Raiffa,et al.  Applied Statistical Decision Theory. , 1961 .

[80]  D. Ellsberg.  Decision, probability, and utility: Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms , 1961 .

[81]  Robert Schlaifer,et al.  Probability And Statistics For Business Decisions , 1960 .

[82]  G. Thompson,et al.  The Theory of Committees and Elections. , 1959 .

[83]  A. Downs.  An Economic Theory of Democracy , 1957 .

[84]  Steven Vajda,et al.  Theory of games and statistical decisions , 1955 .

[85]  L. J. Savage,et al.  The Foundations of Statistics , 1955 .

[86]  Martin Shubik,et al.  A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System , 1954, American Political Science Review.

[87]  W. Edwards.  The theory of decision making. , 1954, Psychological bulletin.

[88]  M. Allais.  Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque : critique des postulats et axiomes de l'ecole americaine , 1953 .

[89]  Alfred De Grazia,et al.  Mathematical Derivation of an Election System , 1953 .

[90]  Kenneth O. May,et al.  A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision , 1952 .

[91]  L. A. Goodman,et al.  Social Choice and Individual Values , 1951 .

[92]  Abraham Wald,et al.  Statistical Decision Functions , 1951 .

[93]  L. J. Savage,et al.  The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk , 1948, Journal of Political Economy.

[94]  D. Black.  On the Rationale of Group Decision-making , 1948, Journal of Political Economy.

[95]  J. Neumann,et al.  Theory of games and economic behavior , 1945, 100 Years of Math Milestones.

[96]  B. D. Finetti.  La prévision : ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives , 1937 .

[97]  F. Galton.  One Vote, One Value , 1907, Nature.

[98]  P.-C.-F. Daunou,et al.  Mémoire sur les élections au scrutin , 1803 .