Effects-Based Operations (EBO): A Grand Challenge for the Analytical Community

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND ® is a registered trademark. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of its research sponsors. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. PREFACE The impetus for this monograph was provided by a project on force transformation for the Commander in Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command and his Director of Joint Experimentation (J-9) and a project on advanced modeling methods for the United States Air Force Research Laboratory. The monograph also drew on the research of a cross-cutting project on transformation concepts for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff. This study should be of interest to both civilian and military consumers of analysis and the analysts and modelers who seek to inform development of military forces and doctrine.

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