What is wrong with the new institutional economics (and what is still wrong with the old)

It is one of the objectives of this paper to respond to the self-proclaimed superiority of the new institutionalists over the old. New institutionalists have found little of value in the old, largely dismissing its approach and its concerns in favour of a more purely individualistic approach and one emphasizing invisible-hand and evolutionary processes. Nevertheless, it is the argument of this paper that in terms of the development of an adequate treatment of institutions it is far from obvious that the NIE, if it remains so narrowly constituted, can provide more than a part. The emphasis of the OIE on particular institutional histories, collective decision-making processes, and institutional failures retains its place, even in the face of the self-assured assault of the new.

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