Seasons, stress, salience, and support for cooperative groundwater management

Cooperative management of shared groundwater resources in the High Plains region of the United States is critical to support sustainable agricultural‐based economies. This research uses a repeat‐sample survey of agricultural producers in the states of Colorado and Nebraska to analyze how seasonal changes and variation in stress and salience influence support for groundwater management. We find that support for groundwater management tends to be lower in the fall, when agricultural producers are engaged in harvest activities. The results also reveal that changes in the salience of commodity prices and water availability can drive changes in support for groundwater management.

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