论文信息 - Equilibrium Concepts for Social Interaction Models

Equilibrium Concepts for Social Interaction Models

This paper describes the relationship between two different binary choice social interaction models. The Brock and Durlauf (2001) model is essentially a static Nash equilibrium model with random utility preferences. In the Blume (2003) model is a population game model similar to Blume (1993), Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993). We show that the equilibria of the Brock–Durlauf model are steady states of a differential equation which is a deterministic approximation of the sample-path behavior of Blume's model. Moreover, the limit distribution of this model clusters around a subset of the steady states when the population is large.

Lawrence E. Blume | Steven Durlauf | L. Blume | S. Durlauf

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