Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-91: A Failed or Impossible Task?

I E a r l y on the morning of August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops poured across the border into Kuwait. Within a few hours, Kuwait’s limited resistance had collapsed, the Emir had fled, and Iraq’s forces had occupied and controlled all of Kuwait. The invasion and occupation of Kuwait had been preceded by a confused and half-hearted attempt by the United States to deter Iraq from using force against Kuwait and to reassure Iraq of its benign intentions; it is not surprising that both deterrence and reassurance failed.’ The intriguing question is whether, if the United States had tried seriously to deter Iraq before it invaded Kuwait, deterrence would have succeeded in preventing the attack. After Iraq’s invasion, occupation, and annexation of Kuwait, the United States assembled a broad international coalition that signalled its determination to go to war to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait if Iraq did not