Vickrey Pricing in Network Routing: Fast Payment Computation

VickreyPricinginNetworkRouting:FastPaymentComputationJohnHershb ergerMentorGraphicsCorp.8005SWBo eckmanRoadWilsonville,OR97070,USAjohnh@wv.mentorg.comSubhashSuriComputerScienceDepartmentUniversityofCaliforniaSantaBarbara,CA93106,suri@cs.ucsb.eduAbstractElicitingtruthfulresp onsesfromself-interestedagentsisanimp ortantproblemingametheoryandmicro economics,itisstudiedundermechanismdesignorimplementationtheory.Truthfulmechanismshavereceivedconsiderableinterestwithincomputersciencerecentlyfordesigningproto colsforInternet-basedapplications,whichtypicallyinvolveco op erationofmultipleself-interestedagents.Acornerstoneofthemechanismdesign eldisVickreyhanism,ormoregenerallytheclassofVickrey-Clarke-Grovesmechanisms.Thesehanismsareknowntob eincentive-compatible,meaningthatrationalagentsmaximizetheirutilitybtruthfullyrevealingtheirpreferences.IntheVickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)mechanism,eachagentreceiva\payment"forhisparticipation,andthispatisprop ortionaltotheadded\value"hebringstothesystem.ImplementingVCGmechanismoftenrequiressolvinga(non-trivial)optimizationproblemn+1times,oncewithallagents,andcorresp ondingtoeacht'sdeletiontodeterminehisincrementalvalue.Animp ortantalgorithmicchallengeisreducethiscomputationaloverhead.Weinvestigatethisproblemthesp eci ccontextofnetworkrouting,wheretherehasb eenasurgeofinterestpricingnetworkusage.RoutingtheInternetvolvesmultipleagents(suchasorganizationsorserviceproviders)whoareself-interested,andthustheVickreycomp ensationmechanismisrelevantforelicitingtruthfulresp onse.Inthiscontextofshortestpathrouting,weshowthattheVickreypaymentsforallagencanb ecomputedinsameasymptotictimecomplexityasforoneagent,thussolvinganop enproblemofNisanandRonen[12].

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