A bargaining approach to coordination in networks

This paper, presents a model in which players interact via the formation of costly links and the benefits of bilateral interactions are determined by a stag-hunt game. A novel contribution of this paper is that the fraction of the cost borne by each player involved in a bilateral link is not fixed exogenously, but results from bargaining. We analyze the model both in a static and a dynamic setting. Whereas the static game has multiplicity of equilibria, we show that only one is stochastically stable.

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