论文信息 - An implementation of the Owen value

An implementation of the Owen value

Abstract We present an implementation of the Owen value (Owen, 1977, Essays in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory, pp. 76–88), inspired by the bidding mechanism introduced by Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001, J. Econ. Theory 100, 274–294). The idea is the following: first players of each coalition play the bidding mechanism trying to obtain the resources of the coalition. Later, players who obtained the resources play the bidding mechanism in order to share the surplus.

Gustavo Bergantiños | Juan J. Vidal-Puga

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