论文信息 - Control of Market Power in Electricity Auctions

Control of Market Power in Electricity Auctions

Abstract In auction spot markets, suppliers with a relatively small percentage of total capacity have been able to exercise extreme market power during high-demand periods. One remedy is a system that prevents suppliers with the capacity and incentive for exercising such unilateral power from having any role in setting the market-clearing price.

Michael H. Rothkopf | M. Rothkopf

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