Optimal Coordination Strategies for Load Service Entity and Community Energy Systems Based on Centralized and Decentralized Approaches

The energy interaction among a load service entity and community energy systems in neighboring communities leads to a complex energy generation, storage, and transaction problem. A load service entity is formed by a local electricity generation system, storage system, and renewable energy resources, which can provide ancillary services to customers and the utility grid. This paper proposes two coordination schemes for the interaction of community-based energy systems and load service entities based on game-theoretic frameworks. The first one is a centralized coordination scheme with full cooperation, in which the load service entity and community energy systems jointly activate the local resources. The second one is set as a decentralized coordination scheme to obtain a relative balance of interests among the market participants in a Stackelberg framework. Two mathematical models are developed for the day-ahead decision-making of the above energy management schemes. The Shapley value method, Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, and strong dual theory are applied to solve the complex coordination problems. Numerical study shows the effectiveness of the coordination strategies that all stakeholders benefit from the proposed coordination schemes and create a win–win situation. In addition, sensitivity analysis is conducted to study the effects of system configuration, energy demand, and energy prices on the economic performance of all stakeholders. The results can serve as references for business managers of the load service entity.

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