Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory *

We discuss the strong connections between auction theory and ''standard'' economic theory; we show that situations that do not at first sight look like auctions can be recast to use auction-theoretic techniques; and we argue that auction-theoretic tools and intuitions can provide useful arguments and insights in a broad range of mainstream economic settings. We also discuss some more obvious applications, especially to industrial organization. Disclaimer: We do not contend that the following ideas are all as important as the one illustrated here, merely that those who have not imbibed auction theory are missing out on a potent brew! Athey was an excellent discussant of my lecture. I also received extremely helpful comments and advice from many other friends and colleagues, including

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