A STAMP-Based Causal Analysis of the Korean Sewol Ferry Accident

The increased complexity of socio-technical systems has revealed the limited contributions of existing event-based accident analysis methods on sustainable safety improvements. Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) – constructed upon Systems Theory – deploys a holistic approach to safety and provides broad insights into accident causality via the integration of the analysis from both direct and indirect factors involved. A dedicated STAMP-based analysis is conducted in this paper by taking the recent Sewol ferry tragedy as an example, to illustrate the utility of applying the STAMP-Model to the maritime transportation domain and to stimulate a broader view of accident mechanisms that expands casual analysis beyond immediate physical failures to a systemic view. Some recommendations are developed for continuous improvements and corrective actions to prevent such catastrophic accident from future occurrences.

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