Lab Experiments for the Study of Social-Ecological Systems

Learning to Work Together In group endeavors, there is often a tension between working for the greater good of the group as a whole versus working for one's own benefit. Sometimes these paths coincide and sometimes they do not; furthermore, the choices made by other group members can influence the calculation of which path to take. A pair of studies now approaches this challenge from experimental and theoretical points of view. In a forest or fishery, harvesting of wood or food needs to take into account the renewable character of the resource, as well as spatial heterogeneity. Janssen et al. (p. 613; see the Perspective by Putterman) show that communication among the group members is key, both to establishing a maintainable rate of harvesting, as well as enforcement via punishment of noncompliers. Boyd et al. (p. 617; see the Perspective by Putterman) develop a model showing that punishment, which is a costly activity, is most effectively levied when implemented with the approval of group members; that is, coordinated punishment works to the benefit of the whole, whereas individual actions do not. Communication and coordination are essential components in cooperative endeavors. Governance of social-ecological systems is a major policy problem of the contemporary era. Field studies of fisheries, forests, and pastoral and water resources have identified many variables that influence the outcomes of governance efforts. We introduce an experimental environment that involves spatial and temporal resource dynamics in order to capture these two critical variables identified in field research. Previous behavioral experiments of commons dilemmas have found that people are willing to engage in costly punishment, frequently generating increases in gross benefits, contrary to game-theoretical predictions based on a static pay-off function. Results in our experimental environment find that costly punishment is again used but lacks a gross positive effect on resource harvesting unless combined with communication. These findings illustrate the importance of careful generalization from the laboratory to the world of policy.

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