Relationship management: A call for fewer influence attempts?

Abstract Using data from a nationwide survey of 349 beer distributors we test two sets of hypotheses: (1) frequency of coercive and noncoercive influence strategy use impacts the level of commitment, trust, and satisfaction in marketing distribution systems, and (2) influence strategy use interacts with relationship structure (relationalism) to determine channel commitment, trust, and satisfaction. The results of the first set of hypotheses suggest that, independent of relationship structure, a supplier's use of noncoercive strategies is associated with increased distributor commitment, trust, and satisfaction, while coercive strategies are associated with reduced levels of commitment and trust. The results also confirm the hypothesis that in highly relational systems, increases in noncoercive influence attempts negatively impact trust and satisfaction. Thus, high levels of relationalism reverse the initial positive impact of noncoercive influence attempts. These findings support the proposition that more communication is not always better. Once relational norms develop in a channel relationship, increases in the supplier's use of either coercive or noncoercive influence attempts negatively impact the relationship.

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