论文信息 - Economic Mechanism Design for Computerized Agents

Economic Mechanism Design for Computerized Agents

The field of economic mechanism design has been an active area of research in economics for at least 20 years. This field uses the tools of economics and game theory to design "rules of interaction" for economic transactions that will, in principle, yield some desired outcome. In this paper I provide an overview of this subject for an audience interested in applications to electronic commerce and discuss some special problems that arise in this context.

Hal R. Varian | H. Varian

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