Reduced Form Auctions Revisited
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This note uses Farkas’s Lemma to prove new results on the implementability of general, asymmetric auctions, and to provide simpler proofs of known results for symmetric auctions. The tradeoff is that type spaces are taken to be finite. JEL classification numbers: D44
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