论文信息 - The Aumann-DrèZE Value, the Wiese Value, and stability: a Note

The Aumann-DrèZE Value, the Wiese Value, and stability: a Note

In this note we present an example of a TU game where both the value presented by Aumann and Dreze (1974) and the value introduced by Wiese (2007) do not exhibit a stable coalition structure.

Andreas Tutic

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