Stochastic stability in three-player games

Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic models. Although in many situations the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games. Only recently were evolutionarily stable strategies defined for multi-player games and their properties analyzed [Broom, M., Cannings, C., Vickers, G.T., 1997. Multi-player matrix games. Bull. Math. Biol. 59, 931–952]. Here we study the long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of populations of randomly matched individuals playing symmetric three-player games. We analyze the stochastic stability of equilibria in games with multiple evolutionarily stable strategies. We also show that, in some games, a population may not evolve in the long run to an evolutionarily stable equilibrium.

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