Bayesian Implementable Efficient and Core Allocations

I examine the implementation of core allocations when agents are differently informed. A one state deviation principle (an allocation cannot be improved at any state) and measurability restrictions (blocking allocations may only be measurable with respect to each agent’s private information) are sufficient to yield interim core solutions that are Bayesian implementable. Private measurability of blocking allocations is necessary for implementation. Similar results hold for interim efficiency. However, the results cannot be extended to exclusive information environments.

[1]  Nicholas C. Yannelis,et al.  Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information , 1993 .

[2]  Nicholas C. Yannelis,et al.  Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies , 2001 .

[3]  Roberto Serrano,et al.  On the Impossibility of Implementation under Incomplete Information , 1999 .

[4]  T. Palfrey,et al.  Private Information in Large Economies , 1986 .

[5]  Frank H. Page.  Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: the core (*) , 1997 .

[6]  John C. Harsanyi,et al.  Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III: Part I. The Basic Model& , 2004, Manag. Sci..

[7]  Oscar Volij.  Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information , 2000, Int. J. Game Theory.

[8]  M. Satterthwaite,et al.  Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading , 1983 .

[9]  R. Myerson,et al.  Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information , 1983 .

[10]  Rafael Repullo,et al.  A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation , 1987 .

[11]  T. Palfrey,et al.  Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies , 1989 .

[12]  Thomas R. Palfrey,et al.  On Bayesian Implementable Allocations , 1987 .

[13]  E. Maskin.  Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality , 1999 .

[14]  David Easley,et al.  Implementation of Walrasian expectations equilibria , 1990 .