Nuclear Energy, Risk, and Emotions

The pictures of the nuclear disaster in Fukushima are in our minds and are updated daily. People from around the world feel compassion for the Japanese, who have had to cope with a triple disaster: earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident. At the moment of writing this piece, it is far from clear how the latter of this apocalyptic triad will end. In the meantime, the debate about nuclear energy has taken an unexpected turn. In the last few years, there was a growing consensus that nuclear energy would be the solution to generate energy without CO2 emissions. The probability of an accident was said to be negligible. However, now that an accident has occurred, many people wonder whether nuclear energy is a really wise option (cf., e.g., Macilwain 2011). Germany immediately shut down several nuclear reactors, and the German Green Party achieved unprecedented results in the local elections due to its anti-nuclear position. Nevertheless, there seems to be one constant factor in the debate about nuclear energy: proponents call opponents badly informed, emotional, and irrational, using these notions more or less as synonyms. However, such rhetoric denigrates and hinders a real debate about nuclear energy. In addition, it is simply wrong to equate emotions with irrationality, as they can be a source of practical rationality. I will argue that rather than being an obstacle to a meaningful debate about nuclear energy, emotions can be an important source of ethical insight that should be taken seriously. Often when a new technology is introduced, a typical pattern can be observed: society is alarmed and worried about its risky aspects, whereas experts assure them that the risks are negligible. Policy makers typically respond to this in two ways: either they ignore the emotions of the public or they take them as a reason to prohibit

[1]  Melissa L. Finucane,et al.  Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts about Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality , 2004, Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis.

[2]  S. Krimsky,et al.  Social Theories of Risk , 1992 .

[3]  P. Slovic,et al.  The affect heuristic , 2007, European Journal of Operational Research.

[4]  K. Shrader-Frechette Risk and Rationality: Philosophical Foundations for Populist Reforms , 1991 .

[5]  M. Nussbaum,et al.  Upheavals of Thought: The Romantic Ascent: Emily Brontë , 2001 .

[6]  S. Sloman The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. , 1996 .

[7]  P. Ekman,et al.  Approaches To Emotion , 1985 .

[8]  S. Epstein Integration of the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious. , 1994, The American psychologist.

[9]  Robert C. Roberts,et al.  Emotions : an essay in aid of moral psychology , 2003 .

[10]  Sabine Roeser,et al.  Moral Emotions and Intuitions , 2010 .

[11]  Robert C. Solomon,et al.  The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life , 1976 .

[12]  Neelke Doorn Lotte Asveld and Sabine Roeser (eds), The Ethics of Technological Risk , 2009, Sci. Eng. Ethics.

[13]  Sabine Roeser,et al.  The Ethics of Technological Risk , 2009 .

[14]  J. Haidt The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. , 2001, Psychological review.

[15]  C. Sunstein Laws of Fear: Acknowledgments , 2005 .

[16]  Martha C. Nussbaum Upheavals of Thought: Frontmatter , 2001 .

[17]  P. Slovic Perception of risk. , 1987, Science.

[18]  S. Roeser Emotions and risky technologies , 2010 .

[19]  R. Lazarus Emotion and Adaptation , 1991 .

[20]  Cass R. Sunstein Laws of Fear: SOLUTIONS , 2005 .

[21]  S. Roeser The role of emotions in judging the moral acceptability of risks , 2006 .

[22]  Christopher K. Hsee,et al.  Risk as Feelings , 2001, Psychological bulletin.

[23]  L. Zagzebski Emotion and Moral Judgment , 2003 .

[24]  Sven Ove Hansson,et al.  Philosophical Perspectives on Risk , 2004 .