Knowledge sharing and rewards: a game-theoretical perspective

Shared databases are used as tools for knowledge management. But contributing knowledge to the database is a public-goods dilemma. Its specific features are multidimensionality of the goods, resource overlap, interdependency of group members and the lack of a marginal unit of return for individual contributions. An analytical model is presented describing the individual- and group-level payoff function. It shows that rewarding contributions with a cost-compensating bonus can be an effective solution not only at the individual level, but also at the group level. Whether or not a bonus system is self-supporting depends on the critical mass of people on average needing a contribution. This depends on the overlap of the people's resources and their interdependency.

[1]  Jae-Hyeon Ahn,et al.  Rewarding knowledge sharing under measurement inaccuracy , 2005 .

[2]  David M. Messick,et al.  INDIVIDUAL ADAPTATIONS AND STRUCTURAL-CHANGE AS SOLUTIONS TO SOCIAL DILEMMAS , 1983 .

[3]  G. Marwell,et al.  A Theory of the Critical Mass , 1991 .

[4]  P. Kollock.  SOCIAL DILEMMAS: The Anatomy of Cooperation , 1998 .

[5]  J. Ledyard.  Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research , 1994 .

[6]  Zuopeng Zhang,et al.  Facilitating knowledge transfer in organizations through incentive alignment and IT investment , 2004, 37th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2004. Proceedings of the.

[7]  T. L. Schwartz.  The Logic of Collective Action , 1986 .

[8]  Fraser J. M. Reid,et al.  The messaging threshold in computer-mediated communication , 1996 .

[9]  Jay W. Jackson,et al.  Effects of endowment amount and attributions on responses to a subgroup social dilemma , 2001 .

[10]  Angel Cabrera,et al.  Knowledge-Sharing Dilemmas , 2002 .

[11]  Mark A Walker,et al.  The free rider problem: Experimental evidence , 1984 .

[12]  Alexander Ardichvili,et al.  Motivation and barriers to participation in virtual knowledge-sharing communities of practice , 2003, J. Knowl. Manag..

[13]  D. Heckathorn.  The dynamics and dilemmas of collective action , 1996 .

[14]  Melvin J. Kimmel,et al.  Twenty Years of Experimental Gaming: Critique,Synthesis, and Suggestions for the Future , 1977 .

[15]  G. Marwell,et al.  A Theory of the Critical Mass. I. Interdependence, Group Heterogeneity, and the Production of Collective Action , 1985, American Journal of Sociology.

[16]  Brian K. Thorn,et al.  Discretionary Databases: Theory, Data, and Implications , 1990 .

[17]  Miles Hewstone,et al.  'Us meeting them': Intergroup contact, intergroup anxiety and the reduction of prejudice , 2000 .

[18]  C. Parks,et al.  Testing Various Types of Cooperation Rewards in Social Dilemmas , 2000 .

[19]  Stuart E. Madnick,et al.  Why Not One Big Database? Principles for Data Ownership , 1995, Decis. Support Syst..

[20]  Andrew Michener,et al.  FORMAL MODELS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION , 2022 .

[21]  George P. Huber,et al.  Transfer of knowledge in knowledge management systems: unexplored issues and suggested studies , 2001, Eur. J. Inf. Syst..

[22]  Wanda J. Orlikowski,et al.  Learning from Notes: organizational issues in groupware implementation , 1992, CSCW '92.

[23]  Ulrike Cress,et al.  Information Exchange With Shared Databases as a Social Dilemma , 2006, Commun. Res..

[24]  G. Marwell,et al.  The critical mass in collective action , 1993 .

[25]  C. Rusbult,et al.  Development of prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientations: theory and preliminary evidence. , 1997, Journal of personality and social psychology.

[26]  Richard M. Bird,et al.  1. Public goods: the polar case , 1972 .

[27]  D. Heckathorn.  Collective Action and the Second-Order Free-Rider Problem , 1989 .

[28]  Toshio Yamagishi,et al.  Seriousness of Social Dilemmas and the Provision of a Sanctioning System , 1988 .

[29]  R. Mark Isaac,et al.  Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism , 1988 .

[30]  G. Fischer.  Communities of Interest: Learning through the Interaction of Multiple Knowledge Systems , 2001 .

[31]  Peter R. Monge,et al.  Production of Collective Action in Alliance-Based Interorganizational Communication and Information Systems , 1998 .

[32]  M. Lynne Markus,et al.  Toward a “Critical Mass” Theory of Interactive Media , 1987 .

[33]  Tatsuyoshi Saijo,et al.  The “Spite” Dilemma in Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Experiments , 1995 .

[34]  P. Kokkonen,et al.  [Resources in the future]. , 2001, Duodecim; laaketieteellinen aikakauskirja.

[35]  Ulrike Cress,et al.  Social Dilemma in Knowledge Communication via Shared Databases , 2005 .

[36]  P. Oliver.  Formal Models of Collective Action , 1993 .

[37]  Henry Hamburger,et al.  N‐person Prisoner's Dilemma† , 1973 .

[38]  Peter R. Monge,et al.  The Value of Formative Investment in Organizational Federations , 2001 .

[39]  Wanda J. Orlikowski,et al.  Learning from Notes: organizational issues in groupware implementation , 1992, CSCW '92.

[40]  G. Marwell,et al.  The critical mass in collective action : a micro-social theory , 1993 .

[41]  P. Oliver.  Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives for Collective Action: Theoretical Investigations , 1980, American Journal of Sociology.

[42]  D. Wegner.  Transactive Memory: A Contemporary Analysis of the Group Mind , 1987 .

[43]  P. Kollock,et al.  Managing the virtual commons : Cooperation and conflict in computer communities , 1996 .

[44]  R. Mark Isaac,et al.  Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations , 1984 .

[45]  R. Moreland.  Transactive memory: Learning who knows what in work groups and organizations. , 1999 .

[46]  G. Marwell,et al.  Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. I. Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free-Rider Problem , 1979, American Journal of Sociology.

[47]  M. Lynne Markus,et al.  Why CSCW applications fail: problems in the adoption of interdependent work tools , 1990, CSCW '90.

[48]  M. Olson,et al.  The Logic of Collective Action , 1965 .

[49]  Peter R. Monge,et al.  FOSTERING INTRANET KNOWLEDGE- SHARING: AN INTEGRATION OF TRANSACTIVE MEMORY AND PUBLIC GOODS APPROACHES , 2001 .

[50]  Thomas H. Davenport,et al.  Book review:Working knowledge: How organizations manage what they know. Thomas H. Davenport and Laurence Prusak. Harvard Business School Press, 1998. $29.95US. ISBN 0‐87584‐655‐6 , 1998 .

[51]  A. Rapoport,et al.  Prisoner's Dilemma , 1965 .