A blocked takeover in the Polish power sector: A model-based analysis

As the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection refused to approve a government initiated takeover in the Polish power sector and the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection did not make a ruling on that case, the takeover was finally prohibited. In this context, the main aim of this paper is to carry out a quantitative analysis of the impact of the takeover in question on electricity prices and quantities, consumer and producer surpluses, dead weight loss and emissions.

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