Mathematics: Truth and Fiction?

Mark Balaguer's project in this book is extremely ambitious; he sets out to defend both platonism and fictionalism about mathematical entities. Moreover, Balaguer argues that at the end of the day, platonism and fictionalism are on an equal footing. Not content to leave the matter there, however, he advances the anti-metaphysical conclusion that there is no fact of the matter about the existence of mathematical objects. Despite the ambitious nature of this project, for the most part Balaguer does not shortchange the reader on rigor; all the main theses advanced are argued for at length and with remarkable clarity and cogency. There are, of course, gaps in the account (some of which are described below) but these should not be allowed to overshadow the significant steps Balaguer takes towards an extremely interesting philosophy of mathematics—a philosophy of mathematics for which the present reviewers have considerable sympathy. In short, this book is an important contribution to the philosophy-of-mathematics literature.