Side-Channel Attacks and Countermeasures for Identity-Based Cryptographic Algorithm SM9

Identity-based cryptographic algorithm SM9, which has become the main part of the ISO/IEC 14888-3/AMD1 standard in November 2017, employs the identities of users to generate public-private key pairs. Without the support of digital certificate, it has been applied for cloud computing, cyber-physical system, Internet of Things, and so on. In this paper, the implementation of SM9 algorithm and its Simple Power Attack (SPA) are discussed. Then, we present template attack and fault attack on SPA-resistant SM9. Our experiments have proved that if attackers try the template attack on an 8-bit microcontrol unit, the secret key can be revealed by enabling the device to execute one time. Fault attack even allows the attackers to obtain the 256-bit key of SM9 by performing the algorithm twice and analyzing the two different results. Accordingly, some countermeasures to resist the three kinds of attacks above are given.

[1]  Ramesh Karri,et al.  Scan based side channel attack on dedicated hardware implementations of Data Encryption Standard , 2004 .

[2]  Mohsen Guizani,et al.  Secure and Efficient Time Synchronization in Heterogeneous Sensor Networks , 2008, IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology.

[3]  Ingrid Verbauwhede,et al.  An Updated Survey on Secure ECC Implementations: Attacks, Countermeasures and Cost , 2012, Cryptography and Security.

[4]  Nigel P. Smart,et al.  Preventing SPA/DPA in ECC Systems Using the Jacobi Form , 2001, CHES.

[5]  P. L. Montgomery.  Modular multiplication without trial division , 1985 .

[6]  Stefan Mangard,et al.  A Simple Power-Analysis (SPA) Attack on Implementations of the AES Key Expansion , 2002, ICISC.

[7]  Eli Biham,et al.  Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems , 1997, CRYPTO.

[8]  Jie Wu,et al.  Defending Resource Depletion Attacks on Implantable Medical Devices , 2010, 2010 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference GLOBECOM 2010.

[9]  Xiaojiang Du,et al.  Improving coverage performance in sensor networks by using mobile sensors , 2005, MILCOM 2005 - 2005 IEEE Military Communications Conference.

[10]  Christophe Clavier,et al.  Correlation Power Analysis with a Leakage Model , 2004, CHES.

[11]  Mohsen Guizani,et al.  Transactions papers a routing-driven Elliptic Curve Cryptography based key management scheme for Heterogeneous Sensor Networks , 2009, IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications.

[12]  Paul C. Kocher,et al.  Differential Power Analysis , 1999, CRYPTO.

[13]  Yuval Yarom,et al.  FLUSH+RELOAD: A High Resolution, Low Noise, L3 Cache Side-Channel Attack , 2014, USENIX Security Symposium.

[14]  Hsie-Chia Chang,et al.  An Efficient Countermeasure against Correlation Power-Analysis Attacks with Randomized Montgomery Operations for DF-ECC Processor , 2012, CHES.

[15]  Alessandro Barenghi,et al.  Fault Injection Attacks on Cryptographic Devices: Theory, Practice, and Countermeasures , 2012, Proceedings of the IEEE.

[16]  Alfred Menezes,et al.  Software Implementation of the NIST Elliptic Curves Over Prime Fields , 2001, CT-RSA.

[17]  JaeCheol Ha,et al.  Randomized Signed-Scalar Multiplication of ECC to Resist Power Attacks , 2002, CHES.

[18]  Tsuyoshi Takagi,et al.  A Fast Parallel Elliptic Curve Multiplication Resistant against Side Channel Attacks , 2002, Public Key Cryptography.

[19]  L. Goubin,et al.  DES and Differential Power Analysis , 1999 .

[20]  Tolga Acar,et al.  Analyzing and comparing Montgomery multiplication algorithms , 1996, IEEE Micro.

[21]  Máire O'Neill,et al.  Coarsely integrated operand scanning (CIOS) architecture for high-speed Montgomery modular multiplication , 2004, Proceedings. 2004 IEEE International Conference on Field- Programmable Technology (IEEE Cat. No.04EX921).

[22]  Mohsen Guizani,et al.  An effective key management scheme for heterogeneous sensor networks , 2007, Ad Hoc Networks.

[23]  Vincent Rijmen,et al.  A Side-Channel Analysis Resistant Description of the AES S-Box , 2005, FSE.

[24]  Adi Shamir,et al.  Identity-Based Cryptosystems and Signature Schemes , 1984, CRYPTO.