Verifying information flow properties of hybrid systems

In this paper, we study the problem of analyzing information flow properties of hybrid systems. We begin by formalizing non-interference -- the baseline information flow property -- for hybrid systems. We then present a type system for statically enforcing non-interference, together with a proof of soundness. We conclude with discussions on future work towards analyzing more permissive information flow properties.

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