Quality Assurance in Construction by Independent Experts: A Case Study of the Efficiency Performance of State-Owned Enterprises in China

As a contribution to the wider theoretical discussion on quality assurance in team production, this case study describes, using the capital–output ratio as a measure of efficiency performance, the quality control problems of Chinese construction state-owned enterprises and explains, with reference to relevant scholarly opinions, why the outcome of legislative requirements for experts falls short of expectations in terms of neo-institutional economic reasoning. This is so, even though the law apparently addresses the principal-agent problem in teamwork by strengthening monitoring.

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