Triage Protocol Design for Ventilator Rationing in a Pandemic: A Proposal to Integrate Multiple Ethical Values through Reserves

In the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, the rationing of medical resources has become a critical issue. Nearly all existing triage protocols are based on a priority point system, in which an explicit formula specifies the order in which the total supply of a particular resource, such as a ventilator, is to be rationed for eligible patients. A priority point system generates the same priority ranking to ration all the units. Triage protocols in some states (e.g. Michigan) prioritize frontline health workers giving heavier weight to the ethical prin- ciple of instrumental valuation. Others (e.g. New York) do not, reasoning that if medical workers obtain high enough priority, there is a risk that they obtain all units and none remain for the general community. This debate is particularly pressing given substantial Covid-19 related health risks for frontline medical workers. In this paper, we propose that medical resources be rationed through a reserve system. In a reserve system, ventilators are placed into multiple categories. Priorities guiding allocation of units can reflect different ethical values between these categories. For example, while a reserve category for essential personnel can emphasize the reciprocity and instrumental value, a reserve category for general community can give higher weight to the values of utility and distributive justice. A reserve system provides additional flexibility over a priority point system because it does not dictate a single priority order for the allocation of all units. It offers a middle-ground approach that balances competing objectives. However, this flexibility requires careful attention to implementation, most notably the processing order of reserve categories, given that transparency is essential for triage protocol design. In this paper, we describe our mathematical model of a reserve system, characterize its potential outcomes, and examine distributional implications of par- ticular reserve systems. We also discuss several practical considerations with triage protocol design.

[1]  Tayfun Sönmez,et al.  Constitutional Implementation of Vertical and Horizontal Reservations in India: A Unified Mechanism for Civil Service Allocation and College Admissions , 2019 .

[2]  Parag A. Pathak,et al.  School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation. NBER Working Paper No. 16783. , 2011 .

[3]  Tayfun Sönmez,et al.  Affirmative Action in India via Vertical and Horizontal Reservations , 2019 .

[4]  Battal Dogan,et al.  Responsive Affirmative Action in School Choice , 2016, J. Econ. Theory.

[5]  Orhan Aygün,et al.  Large-Scale Affirmative Action in School Choice: Admissions to IITs in India , 2017 .

[6]  F. Kojima,et al.  Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications , 2015 .

[7]  Yuichiro Kamada,et al.  Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints , 2017, J. Econ. Theory.

[8]  Atila Abdulkadiroglu,et al.  College admissions with affirmative action , 2005, Int. J. Game Theory.

[9]  Alexander Teytelboym,et al.  The Local Refugee Match: Aligning Refugees’ Preferences with the Capacities and Priorities of Localities , 2018 .

[10]  Bertram L Kasiske,et al.  New national allocation policy for deceased donor kidneys in the United States and possible effect on patient outcomes. , 2014, Journal of the American Society of Nephrology : JASN.

[11]  M. Utku Ünver,et al.  Course Bidding at Business Schools , 2007 .

[12]  Inácio Bó,et al.  Fair implementation of diversity in school choice , 2016, Games Econ. Behav..

[13]  Eric Budish,et al.  The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes , 2010, Journal of Political Economy.

[14]  Allocation of Scarce Critical Care Resources During a Public Health Emergency Executive Summary , 2020 .

[15]  Peter Troyan,et al.  Improving Matching under Hard Distributional Constraints , 2015 .

[16]  F. Echenique,et al.  How to Control Controlled School Choice , 2014 .

[17]  A. Roth,et al.  The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design , 1999, The American economic review.

[18]  David Manlove,et al.  The College Admissions problem with lower and common quotas , 2010, Theor. Comput. Sci..

[19]  B. Lo,et al.  A Framework for Rationing Ventilators and Critical Care Beds During the COVID-19 Pandemic. , 2020, JAMA.

[20]  G. Fabian,et al.  South Carolina prepares for pandemic influenza. , 2008, Journal of the South Carolina Medical Association.

[21]  Parag A. Pathak,et al.  Explicit vs. Statistical Preferential Treatment in Affirmative Action: Theory and Evidence from Chicago&Apos;S Exam Schools , 2016 .

[22]  E. Toner,et al.  The community speaks: understanding ethical values in allocation of scarce lifesaving resources during disasters. , 2014, Annals of the American Thoracic Society.

[23]  A. Roth The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory , 1984, Journal of Political Economy.

[24]  Orhan Aygun,et al.  Dynamic Reserves in Matching Markets , 2016, J. Econ. Theory.

[25]  M. Balinski,et al.  A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement , 1999 .

[26]  Tayfun Sönmez,et al.  Matching With (Branch‐of‐Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy , 2013 .

[27]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction , 1999, Journal of Political Economy.

[28]  T. Cook,et al.  Development of a triage protocol for critical care during an influenza pandemic , 2006, Canadian Medical Association Journal.

[29]  J. Vincent,et al.  The SOFA (Sepsis-related Organ Failure Assessment) score to describe organ dysfunction/failure , 1996, Intensive Care Medicine.

[30]  Inácio Bó,et al.  College Admission with Multidimensional Reserves: The Brazilian A¢ rmative Action Case , 2013 .

[31]  Parag A. Pathak,et al.  Reversing Reserves , 2020, Manag. Sci..

[32]  Atila Abdulkadiroglu,et al.  School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach , 2003 .

[33]  Yashodhan Kanoria,et al.  Centralized Admissions for Engineering Colleges in India , 2019, EC.

[34]  Tommy Andersson,et al.  Refugee Matching as a Market Design Application , 2019, The Future of Economic Design.

[35]  E. K. McGorty,et al.  Ethical guidelines for an influenza pandemic. , 2007, North Carolina medical journal.

[36]  James Schummer,et al.  Incentives in landing slot problems , 2017, J. Econ. Theory.

[37]  B. Lo,et al.  Who Should Receive Life Support During a Public Health Emergency? Using Ethical Principles to Improve Allocation Decisions , 2009, Annals of Internal Medicine.

[38]  Parag A. Pathak,et al.  Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism , 2008 .

[39]  Tayfun Sönmez Bidding for Army Career Specialties: Improving the ROTC Branching Mechanism , 2013, Journal of Political Economy.

[40]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications , 2013 .

[41]  Scott Duke Kominers,et al.  Matching with Slot-Specific Priorities: Theory , 2016 .

[42]  Yuichiro Kamada,et al.  Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition: Matching with constraints , 2018 .

[43]  L. S. Shapley,et al.  College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage , 2013, Am. Math. Mon..

[44]  Ezekiel J Emanuel,et al.  Fair Allocation of Scarce Medical Resources in the Time of Covid-19. , 2020, The New England journal of medicine.

[45]  Isa Emin Hafalir,et al.  Effective affirmative action in school choice , 2011 .

[46]  Parag A. Pathak,et al.  Reserve Design: Unintended Consequences and the Demise of Boston’s Walk Zones , 2018, Journal of Political Economy.

[47]  M. Utku Ünver,et al.  Incentivized Kidney Exchange , 2020 .

[48]  Robert D Truog,et al.  The Toughest Triage - Allocating Ventilators in a Pandemic. , 2020, The New England journal of medicine.

[49]  José R. Correa,et al.  School Choice in Chile , 2019, EC.

[50]  Alvin E. Roth,et al.  Pairwise Kidney Exchange , 2004, J. Econ. Theory.

[51]  Alexander Westkamp An analysis of the German university admissions system , 2013 .

[52]  Isa Emin Hafalir,et al.  School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds Versus Soft Bounds , 2011, J. Econ. Theory.

[53]  Parag A. Pathak,et al.  Immigration Lottery Design: Engineered and Coincidental Consequences of H-1b Reforms , 2020, The Review of Economics and Statistics.

[54]  David Delacrétaz Refugee Resettlement , 2022 .

[55]  Fuhito Kojima,et al.  School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action , 2012, Games Econ. Behav..

[56]  Rakesh V. Vohra,et al.  Assignment of Arrival Slots , 2013 .