Ramp-Induced Data Attacks on Look-Ahead Dispatch in Real-Time Power Markets

This paper presents a new class of false data injection attacks on state estimation, which may lead to financial arbitrage in real-time power markets with an emerging look-ahead dispatch model. In comparison with prior work of cyber attack on static dispatch where no inter-temporal ramping constraint is considered, we propose a novel attack strategy with which the attacker can manipulate, in look-ahead dispatch, the limits of ramp constraints of generators. It is demonstrated that the proposed attack may lead to financial profits via malicious capacity withholding of selected generators, while being undetected by the existing bad data detection algorithm embedded in the state estimator. The feasibility of such cyber attacks and their economic impact on real-time electricity market operations are illustrated in the IEEE 14-bus system.

[1]  Rong Zheng,et al.  Stealth false data injection using independent component analysis in smart grid , 2011, 2011 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm).

[2]  Siddharth Sridhar,et al.  Cyber–Physical System Security for the Electric Power Grid , 2012, Proceedings of the IEEE.

[3]  Felix F. Wu,et al.  Folk theorems on transmission access: Proofs and counterexamples , 1996 .

[4]  H. Vincent Poor,et al.  Strategic Protection Against Data Injection Attacks on Power Grids , 2011, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid.

[5]  Deepa Kundur,et al.  Towards a Framework for Cyber Attack Impact Analysis of the Electric Smart Grid , 2010, 2010 First IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications.

[6]  A.C. Tellidou,et al.  Agent-Based Analysis of Capacity Withholding and Tacit Collusion in Electricity Markets , 2007, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.

[7]  A. G. Expósito,et al.  Power system state estimation : theory and implementation , 2004 .

[8]  Kameshwar Poolla,et al.  Smart grid data integrity attacks: characterizations and countermeasuresπ , 2011, 2011 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm).

[9]  H. Vincent Poor,et al.  Distributed joint cyber attack detection and state recovery in smart grids , 2011, 2011 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm).

[10]  Ross Anderson,et al.  Who Controls the off Switch? , 2010, 2010 First IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications.

[11]  H. Vincent Poor,et al.  Smart meter privacy: A utility-privacy framework , 2011, 2011 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm).

[12]  Lang Tong,et al.  Malicious data attack on real-time electricity market , 2011, 2011 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP).

[13]  Bruce H. Krogh,et al.  Wind Integration in Power Systems: Operational Challenges and Possible Solutions , 2011, Proceedings of the IEEE.

[14]  John Lygeros,et al.  Cyber attack in a two-area power system: Impact identification using reachability , 2010, Proceedings of the 2010 American Control Conference.

[15]  Leigh Tesfatsion,et al.  Capacity withholding in restructured wholesale power markets: An agent-based test bed study , 2009, 2009 IEEE/PES Power Systems Conference and Exposition.

[16]  H. Vincent Poor,et al.  Competitive privacy in the smart grid: An information-theoretic approach , 2011, 2011 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm).

[17]  Mani B. Srivastava,et al.  Cooperative state estimation for preserving privacy of user behaviors in smart grid , 2011, 2011 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm).

[18]  Peng Ning,et al.  False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grids , 2011, TSEC.

[19]  Xiaoqian Jiang,et al.  A Randomized Response Model for Privacy Preserving Smart Metering , 2012, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid.

[20]  Bruno Sinopoli,et al.  Integrity Data Attacks in Power Market Operations , 2011, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid.

[21]  G. Manimaran,et al.  Data integrity attacks and their impacts on SCADA control system , 2010, IEEE PES General Meeting.

[22]  L. Tong,et al.  Malicious Data Attacks on Smart Grid State Estimation: Attack Strategies and Countermeasures , 2010, 2010 First IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications.