论文信息 - The Majority Judgement Voting Procedure : A Critical Evaluation 1

The Majority Judgement Voting Procedure : A Critical Evaluation 1

We evaluate critically some of the properties of the Majority Judgement voting procedure recently proposed by Balinski and Laraki for the election of one out of two or more candidates.

Dan S. Felsenthal | Moshé Machover | D. Felsenthal | M. Machover

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