Vagueness and Imprecise Imitation in Signalling Games

Signalling games are popular models for studying the evolution of meaning, but typical approaches do not incorporate vagueness as a feature of successful signalling. Complementing recent like-minded models, we describe an aggregate population-level dynamic that describes a process of imitation of successful behaviour under imprecise perception and realization of similar stimuli. Applying this new dynamic to a generalization of Lewis’s signalling games, we show that stochastic imprecision leads to vague, yet by-and-large efficient signal use, and, moreover, that it unifies evolutionary outcomes and helps avoid sub-optimal categorization. The upshot of this is that we see ‘as-if’-generalization at an aggregate level, without agents actually generalizing. 1 Introduction 2 Background   2.1 Sim-max games and conceptual spaces   2.2 Vagueness in sim-max games and conceptual spaces   2.3 Vagueness, functional pressure, and transmission biases 3 Imprecise Imitation   3.1 Replicator dynamic in behavioural strategies   3.2 Noise-perturbed conditional imitation 4 Exploring Imprecise Imitation   4.1 Setting the stage   4.2 Simulation set-up   4.3 Measures of interest   4.4 Results 5 Discussion   5.1 Levels of vagueness   5.2 Evolutionary benefits of imprecision   5.3 Related work 6 Conclusion Appendix  1 Introduction 2 Background   2.1 Sim-max games and conceptual spaces   2.2 Vagueness in sim-max games and conceptual spaces   2.3 Vagueness, functional pressure, and transmission biases   2.1 Sim-max games and conceptual spaces   2.2 Vagueness in sim-max games and conceptual spaces   2.3 Vagueness, functional pressure, and transmission biases 3 Imprecise Imitation   3.1 Replicator dynamic in behavioural strategies   3.2 Noise-perturbed conditional imitation   3.1 Replicator dynamic in behavioural strategies   3.2 Noise-perturbed conditional imitation 4 Exploring Imprecise Imitation   4.1 Setting the stage   4.2 Simulation set-up   4.3 Measures of interest   4.4 Results   4.1 Setting the stage   4.2 Simulation set-up   4.3 Measures of interest   4.4 Results 5 Discussion   5.1 Levels of vagueness   5.2 Evolutionary benefits of imprecision   5.3 Related work   5.1 Levels of vagueness   5.2 Evolutionary benefits of imprecision   5.3 Related work 6 Conclusion Appendix 

[1]  S. Levinson,et al.  'Natural Concepts' in the Spatial Topologial Domain--Adpositional Meanings in Crosslinguistic Perspective: An Exercise in Semantic Typology , 2003 .

[2]  H. Young,et al.  The Evolution of Conventions , 1993 .

[3]  D. Fudenberg,et al.  Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks , 1992 .

[4]  Cailin O'Connor,et al.  The Evolution of Vagueness , 2014 .

[5]  D. Luce,et al.  Detection and Recognition " ' , 2006 .

[6]  David Lewis Convention: A Philosophical Study , 1986 .

[7]  M. Franke,et al.  Vagueness , Signaling & Bounded Rationality , 2010 .

[8]  S. Kirby,et al.  The emergence of linguistic structure: an overview of the iterated learning model , 2002 .

[9]  D. McFadden Quantal Choice Analysis: A Survey , 1976 .

[10]  R. Nosofsky Attention, similarity, and the identification-categorization relationship. , 1986, Journal of experimental psychology. General.

[11]  K. Wärneryd Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability , 1993 .

[12]  Martin A. Nowak,et al.  The evolution of syntactic communication , 2000, Nature.

[13]  Angelo Cangelosi,et al.  Simulating the Evolution of Language , 2002, Springer London.

[14]  Gerhard Jäger,et al.  Voronoi languages: Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals , 2011, Games Econ. Behav..

[15]  Andreas Blume,et al.  Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication , 1993 .

[16]  R. Rob,et al.  Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games , 1993 .

[17]  Simon Kirby,et al.  Iterated Learning: A Framework for the Emergence of Language , 2003, Artificial Life.

[18]  Gerhard Jäger,et al.  The evolution of convex categories , 2007 .

[19]  K. Schlag Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits , 1998 .

[20]  C. Pollard,et al.  Center for the Study of Language and Information , 2022 .

[21]  P. Taylor,et al.  Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics , 1978 .

[22]  Barton L. Lipman,et al.  Why is language vague , 2009 .

[23]  N. Foo Conceptual Spaces—The Geometry of Thought , 2022 .

[24]  Andreas Blume,et al.  Intentional Vagueness , 2014 .

[25]  José Pedro Correia,et al.  Towards More Realistic Modeling of Linguistic Color Categorization , 2019, Open Philosophy.

[26]  P. Kay The World Color Survey , 2011 .

[27]  Katherine Hawley,et al.  Trust, Distrust and Commitment , 2014 .

[28]  Territoire Urbain,et al.  Convention , 1955, Hidden Nature.

[29]  Kris De Jaegher,et al.  A Game-Theoretic Rationale for Vagueness , 2003 .

[30]  K. Schlag Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution , 2010 .

[31]  M. Spence Job Market Signaling , 1973 .

[32]  P. Kay,et al.  Color naming reflects optimal partitions of color space , 2007, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

[33]  Josef Hofbauer,et al.  Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics , 1998 .

[34]  Armin W. Schulz Signals: evolution, learning, and information , 2012 .

[35]  Gerhard Jäger,et al.  Language structure: psychological and social constraints , 2007, Synthese.

[36]  S. Kirby,et al.  Iterated learning and the evolution of language , 2014, Current Opinion in Neurobiology.

[37]  Henri Cohen,et al.  Handbook of categorization in cognitive science , 2005 .

[38]  Christina Pawlowitsch,et al.  Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system , 2008, Games Econ. Behav..

[39]  Eugene Galanter,et al.  Handbook of mathematical psychology: I. , 1963 .

[40]  Michael Franke,et al.  Vagueness, Signaling and Bounded Rationality , 2010, JSAI-isAI Workshops.

[41]  Thomas L. Griffiths,et al.  Language Evolution by Iterated Learning With Bayesian Agents , 2007, Cogn. Sci..

[42]  E. Sober,et al.  Reintroducing group selection to the human behavioral sciences , 1994 .

[43]  Gerhard Jäger,et al.  Natural Color Categories Are Convex Sets , 2009, Amsterdam Colloquium on Logic, Language and Meaning.

[44]  Jeffrey A. Barrett,et al.  The Evolution of Coding in Signaling Games , 2009 .

[45]  H. Peyton Young,et al.  Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics , 1990 .

[46]  Kevin J. S. Zollman,et al.  Evolutionary dynamics of Lewis signaling games: signaling systems vs. partial pooling , 2007, Synthese.

[47]  Igor Douven,et al.  Vagueness: A Conceptual Spaces Approach , 2011, Journal of Philosophical Logic.

[48]  R. Cressman Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games , 2003 .

[49]  John W. Du Bois THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF LANGUAGE , 2003 .

[50]  Cailin O'Connor,et al.  Evolving Perceptual Categories , 2014, Philosophy of Science.

[51]  R. Kirk CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY , 1970 .

[52]  J. Sobel,et al.  STRATEGIC INFORMATION TRANSMISSION , 1982 .

[53]  William H. Sandholm,et al.  Population Games And Evolutionary Dynamics , 2010, Economic learning and social evolution.

[54]  Takao Terano,et al.  New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence , 2008, Lecture Notes in Computer Science.

[55]  Simon M. Huttegger Evolutionary Explanations of Indicatives and Imperatives , 2007 .

[56]  Terry Regier,et al.  Chapter 9 – THE WORLD COLOR SURVEY DATABASE , 2005 .

[57]  Kees van Deemter Utility and Language Generation: The Case of Vagueness , 2009, J. Philos. Log..

[58]  Simon M. Huttegger Evolution and the Explanation of Meaning* , 2007, Philosophy of Science.

[59]  R. Duncan Luce,et al.  Individual Choice Behavior: A Theoretical Analysis , 1979 .

[60]  Dirk Helbing,et al.  A stochastic behavioral model and a ‘Microscopic’ foundation of evolutionary game theory , 1996, cond-mat/9805340.

[61]  W. Bruce Croft Typology and Universals , 1990 .

[62]  Martin Haspelmath,et al.  The geometry of grammatical meaning: Semantic maps and cross-linguistic comparison , 2003 .

[63]  David Sloan Wilson,et al.  For the Good of the Group? Exploring Group-Level Evolutionary Adaptations Using Multilevel Selection Theory , 2008 .

[64]  Jacob K. Goeree,et al.  Quantal Response Equilibrium , 2018 .

[65]  J. Townsend,et al.  The Oxford Handbook of Computational and Mathematical Psychology , 2015 .

[66]  Igor Douven,et al.  What Is Graded Membership , 2014 .

[67]  M A Nowak,et al.  Evolution of universal grammar. , 2001, Science.

[68]  Drew Fudenberg,et al.  Imitation Processes with Small Mutations , 2004, J. Econ. Theory.