论文信息 - Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model

Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model

When the dimension of the outcome space in a voting game is sufficiently high, a core outcome will fail to exist for almost all utility profiles. Previous work by Schofield and McKelvey has identified critical dimensions for this generic non-existence, employing results on singularities of mappings and transversal intersections. In this paper we demonstrate that their proofs are incorrect, and determine the right dimensions implied by their singularity approach.

Jeffrey S. Banks | J. Banks

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