Japan's Decision for War in 1941

The last few years have witnessed in Japan the appearance of "Revisionists" who tend to reappraise the meaning of the Pacific War and to reinterpret Japan's responsibility for Pearl Harbor By the "Revrslonlsts " I mean the crrtrcs and hlstonans who in their view of the Pacific War have challenged the "Orthodox" school whose interpretations of the war are basically in line with the decisions of the Tokyo Trial or are based upon the Marxist theory of imperialism. The "Revisionists" have been characterized by their attempts to vindicate Japan's cause in World War II, and by their belief in the inevitability of an armed clash between Japan and the United States. Hayashi Fusao, a famous writer, is one of the best known "Revisionists," having publicized his views in a book entitled Arguments for Justifying the Pactfic War (DaitOa Sens~ Kotei Ron). His argument is that Japan went to war "for the defense of Asia," countering the U S policy of a "White Pacafic " In this connection I may add that the minority dissent of Indian Judge Pal at the Tokyo Trial has also been reassessed by several Japanese schoiars I assume that this recent spurt of "Revisionism" may be explained by the revelations of recently discovered documents as well as by the new tide of nationalism. While not accepting the interpretation of the "Orthodox" school, I would not entirely subscnbe to the "Revrsronrst" school either. I am not inclined toward vindicating Japan's cause in the last war; rather I have a feeling of our responsibility for it. Further, I am deeply convinced that we made a grave mistake in going to war with the U.S., and I feei sorry for its having caused unprecedented sacrifice on the part of many people in many places. Nevertheless, at the same time I am of the opinion that the conclusion arrived at by the Tokyo Military Tribunal, when assesseed by an objective historian twenty years after the Trial, was based on false information and on an incorrect theory. The Tokyo Trial, adopting the general theory of conspiracy, assumed that the Japanese leaders had worked together toward expansion into Southeast Asia, carrying out an expansion program formulated in 1936 and had been well prepared for an armed clash with the U.S. in due course. This interpretation represents a most rational view of the road to Pearl Harbor. Although the theory of conspiracy is not likely to attract much support from schoiars at the present time, there still seems to be a tendency on the part of Western scholars to interpret the process of Japan's decision for war rationally, perhaps projecting the Western model of the decision'making process and Western conceptions of rational behavior. For example, Prof. Louis Morton, asserts in his essay, "Japan's Decision for War", Colmnand