Central Bank Transparency

Central bank transparency has become one of the key features of monetary policy recently. This survey article provides a structured review of the theoretical literature on the consequences of transparency of monetary policy, proposing a distinction between uncertainty and incentive effects of transparency. The theoretical insights are compared to the various ways in which central banks have become transparent in practice. In addition, there is an assessment of the empirical evidence concerning the transparency of monetary policy.

[1]  R. Beetsma,et al.  Why Money Talks and Wealth Whispers: Monetary Uncertainty and Mystique: A Comment , 2003 .

[2]  P. Siklos.  The Changing Face of Central Banking: Evolutionary Trends since World War II , 2002 .

[3]  Stephen G. Cecchetti,et al.  Central Bank Structure, Policy Efficiency, and Macroeconomic Performance: Exploring Empirical Relationships , 2002 .

[4]  A. Cukierman.  Are Contemporary Central Banks Transparent About Economic Models and Objectives and What Difference Does it Make? , 2002, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[5]  Lavan Mahadeva,et al.  Inflation Targets as a Stabilization Device , 2002 .

[6]  H. Gersbach.  On the negative social value of central banks' knowledge transparency , 2002 .

[7]  H. Grüner.  How Much Should Central Banks Talk? A New Argument , 2002 .

[8]  S. Eijffinger,et al.  How Transparent are Central Banks? , 2002 .

[9]  D. Stasavage,et al.  Does it Pay to Be Transparent? International Evidence from Central Bank Forecasts , 2001 .

[10]  Charles Wyplosz.  The Impact of EMU on Europe and the Developing Countries , 2001 .

[11]  Frederic S. Mishkin,et al.  One Decade of Inflation Targeting in the World: What Do We Know and What Do We Need to Know? , 2001 .

[12]  J. Chadha,et al.  Inflation Targeting, Transparency and Interest Rate Volatility: Ditching 'Monetary Mystique' in the U.K. , 2001 .

[13]  H. Jensen.  Optimal Degrees of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking , 2001, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[14]  Bernhard Winkler,et al.  Which Kind of Transparency? On the Need for Clarity in Monetary Policy-Making , 2000, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[15]  P. Geraats,et al.  Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts , 2000, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[16]  Kenneth N. Kuttner,et al.  Inflation, Monetary Transparency, and G3 Exchange Rate Volatility , 2000 .

[17]  D. Romer,et al.  Federal Reserve Information and the Behavior of Interest Rates , 2000 .

[18]  D. Gros,et al.  Open Issues in European Central Banking , 2000 .

[19]  S. Eijffinger,et al.  A Theory of Central Bank Accountability , 2000 .

[20]  Berthold Herrendorf.  Transparency, reputation, and credibility under floating and pegged exchange rates , 1999 .

[21]  O. Issing.  The Eurosystem: Transparent andAccountable or 'Willem in Euroland' , 1999 .

[22]  P. Geraats.  Inflation and Its Variation: An Alternative Explanation , 1999 .

[23]  Jon Faust,et al.  The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy , 1999 .

[24]  C. Walsh.  Announcements, Inflation Targeting and Central Bank Incentives , 1999 .

[25]  W. Buiter.  Alice in Euroland , 1999 .

[26]  J. Galí,et al.  The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective , 1999 .

[27]  E. Schaling,et al.  Monetary Policy Uncertainty and Inflation: The Role of Central Bank Accountability , 1998 .

[28]  Frederic S. Mishkin,et al.  Inflation Targeting: Lessons from the International Experience , 1998 .

[29]  A. Budd.  The Role and Operations of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee , 1998 .

[30]  J. de Haan,et al.  Accountability of Central Banks: Aspects and Quantifications , 1998 .

[31]  R. Beetsma,et al.  Inflation Targets and Contracts with Uncertain Central Banker Preferences , 1998 .

[32]  A. Muscatelli.  Optimal Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences: Accountability Through Independence? , 1998 .

[33]  Shelagh A. Heffernan.  Modelling British Interest Rate Adjustment: An Error Correction Approach , 1997 .

[34]  Eric S. Rosengren,et al.  Is Banking Supervision Central to Central Banking? , 1997 .

[35]  Alan S. Blinder,et al.  Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: What Central Bankers Could Learn from Academics--and Vice Versa , 1997 .

[36]  M. King,et al.  Independence and Accountability , 1996 .

[37]  Lars E. O. Svensson.  Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts , 1995 .

[38]  Seonghwan Oh,et al.  When and How Much to Talk: Credibility and Flexibility in Monetary Policy With Private Information , 1995 .

[39]  M. King.  CREDIBILITY AND MONETARY POLICY: THEORY AND EVIDENCE1 , 1995 .

[40]  G. Tabellini,et al.  Designing institutions for monetary stability , 1993 .

[41]  J. Huyck,et al.  Central Bank Secrecy, Interest Rates, and Monetary Control , 1993 .

[42]  L. Summers,et al.  Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence , 1993 .

[43]  A. Cukierman.  CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY, CREDIBILITY, AND INDEPENDANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE , 1992 .

[44]  Nathan S. Balke,et al.  A Theory of Fed Watching in a Macroeconomic Policy Game , 1992 .

[45]  Jan Rose S∅rensen.  Political uncertainty and macroeconomic performance , 1991 .

[46]  D. Masciandaro,et al.  Political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries , 1991 .

[47]  J. Rudin,et al.  Central bank secrecy, `fed watching', and the predictability of interest rates , 1988 .

[48]  G. Tabellini.  Secrecy of Monetary Policy and the Variability of Interest Rates , 1987 .

[49]  A. Meltzer,et al.  A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information , 1986 .

[50]  Kenneth Rogoff,et al.  The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target''Quarterly Journal of Economics , 1985 .

[51]  Marvin Goodfriend,et al.  Monetary Mystique: Secrecy and Central Banking , 1985 .

[52]  M. Dotsey.  Monetary Policy, Secrecy, and Federal Funds Rate Behavior , 1985 .

[53]  M. Canzoneri.  Monetary policy games and the role of private information , 1984 .

[54]  R. Barro,et al.  Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy , 1983 .

[55]  Stephen F. LeRoy,et al.  The Present-Value Relation: Tests Based on Implied Variance Bounds , 1981 .

[56]  Finn E. Kydland,et al.  Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans , 1977, Journal of Political Economy.

[57]  Thomas J. Sargent,et al.  Rational expectations and the theory of economic policy , 1976 .

[58]  Thomas J. Sargent,et al.  "Rational" Expectations, the Optimal Monetary Instrument, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule , 1975, Journal of Political Economy.

[59]  E. Sterken,et al.  Monetary Policy Rules From , 2004 .

[60]  Jeremy Piger.  Does inflation targeting make a difference , 2004 .

[61]  Lavan Mahadeva,et al.  Inflation Targets as a Stabilisation Device , 2002 .

[62]  S. Athey,et al.  On the optimality of transparent monetary policy , 2001 .

[63]  A. Blinder.  How Do Central Banks Talk , 2001 .

[64]  N. Viegi,et al.  Credibility, Transparency and Asymmetric Information in Monetary Policy , 2001 .

[65]  H. Gersbach,et al.  Voting Transparency and Conflicting Interests in Central Bank Councils , 2001, Social Science Research Network.

[66]  P. Geraats.  Transparency of monetary policy: Does the institutional framework matter , 2001 .

[67]  A. Clare,et al.  What Can We Learn About Monetary Policy Transparency from Financial Market Data? , 2001, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[68]  P. Geraats.  Precommitment, Transparency and Monetary Policy , 2001, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[69]  A. Haldane,et al.  Monetary Policy Surprises and the Yield Curve , 2000 .

[70]  S. Eijffinger,et al.  Central Bank Accountability and Transparency: Theory and Some Evidence , 2000, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[71]  A. Cukierman.  Accountability, Credibility, Transparency and Stabilization Policy in the Eurosystem , 2000 .

[72]  P. Siklos.  Monetary Policy Transparency, Public Commentary, and Market Perceptions About Monetary Policy in Canada , 2000, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[73]  S. Morris,et al.  Welfare Effects of Public Information , 2000, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[74]  Philippe Muller,et al.  Greater Transparency in Monetary Policy: Impact on Financial Markets , 1999 .

[75]  Sveriges Riksbank.  Transparency and credibility : Monetary policy with unobservable goals , 1998 .

[76]  F. Amtenbrink.  The democratic accountability of central banks , 1998 .

[77]  De Haan,et al.  Accountability of Central Banks : Aspects and Quantification , 1998 .

[78]  日本銀行,et al.  Towards more effective monetary policy , 1997 .

[79]  M. Hoeberichts,et al.  Why Money Talks and Wealth Whispers : Monetary Uncertainty and Mystique , 1997 .

[80]  Iwao Kuroda.  Towards More Effective Monetary Policy , 1997 .

[81]  C. Walsh.  Optimal contracts for central bankers , 1995 .

[82]  Susanne Lohmann,et al.  Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility , 1992 .

[83]  C. Green,et al.  Monetary theory and policy , 1991 .

[84]  Seonghwan Oh,et al.  Strategic Discipline in Monetary Policy with Private Information: Optimal Targeting Periods , 1990 .

[85]  J. Stein.  Cheap Talk and the Fed: A Theory of Imprecise Policy Announcements , 1989 .

[86]  William Greider,et al.  Secrets of the temple : how the Federal Reserve runs the country , 1987 .

[87]  R. Barro.  Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information , 1986 .

[88]  D. Backus,et al.  Inflation and Reputation , 1985 .