Using Universal Composition to Design and Analyze Secure Complex Hardware Systems
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Nir Bitansky,et al. Leakage-Tolerant Interactive Protocols , 2012, TCC.
[2] Jan Sölter,et al. PUF modeling attacks: An introduction and overview , 2014, 2014 Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE).
[3] Jean-Pierre Seifert,et al. Cloning Physically Unclonable Functions , 2013, 2013 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST).
[4] Frank Piessens,et al. A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and Defenses , 2018, USENIX Security Symposium.
[5] Ulrich Rührmair,et al. On the practical use of physical unclonable functions in oblivious transfer and bit commitment protocols , 2013, Journal of Cryptographic Engineering.
[6] Jonathan Katz,et al. Universally Composable Multi-party Computation Using Tamper-Proof Hardware , 2007, EUROCRYPT.
[7] Moti Yung,et al. Practical leakage-resilient pseudorandom generators , 2010, CCS '10.
[8] Srinivas Devadas,et al. Modeling attacks on physical unclonable functions , 2010, CCS '10.
[9] Ulrich Rührmair,et al. Practical Security Analysis of PUF-Based Two-Player Protocols , 2012, CHES.
[10] Ran Canetti,et al. Universally composable security: a new paradigm for cryptographic protocols , 2001, Proceedings 2001 IEEE International Conference on Cluster Computing.
[11] Stefan Katzenbeisser,et al. Physically Uncloneable Functions in the Universal Composition Framework , 2011, CRYPTO.
[12] Georg T. Becker,et al. The Gap Between Promise and Reality: On the Insecurity of XOR Arbiter PUFs , 2015, CHES.
[13] Arash Reyhani-Masoleh,et al. Stateless leakage resiliency from NLFSRs , 2017, 2017 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST).
[14] Yuval Ishai,et al. Founding Cryptography on Tamper-Proof Hardware Tokens , 2010, IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch..
[15] G. Edward Suh,et al. Physical Unclonable Functions for Device Authentication and Secret Key Generation , 2007, 2007 44th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference.
[16] Ariel J. Feldman,et al. Lest we remember: cold-boot attacks on encryption keys , 2008, CACM.