A Study of Truck Platooning Incentives Using a Congestion Game

We introduce an atomic congestion game with two types of agents, namely, cars and trucks, to model the traffic flow on a road over various time intervals of the day. Cars maximize their utility by finding a tradeoff between the time they choose to use the road, the average velocity of the flow at that time, and the dynamic congestion tax that they pay for using the road. In addition to these terms, the trucks have an incentive for using the road at the same time as their peers because they have platooning capabilities, which allow them to save fuel. The dynamics and equilibria of this game-theoretic model for the interaction between car traffic and truck platooning incentives are investigated. We use traffic data from Stockholm, Sweden, to validate parts of the modeling assumptions and extract reasonable parameters for the simulations. We use joint strategy fictitious play and average strategy fictitious play to learn a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game. We perform a comprehensive simulation study to understand the influence of various factors, such as the drivers' value of time and the percentage of the trucks that are equipped with platooning devices, on the properties of the Nash equilibrium.

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