The Positive Foundation of the Common Prior Assumption

The existence of a common prior is a property of the state space used to model the players' asymmetric information. We show that this property is not just a technical artifact of the model, but that it is immanent to the players' beliefs. To this end, we devise a condition, phrased solely in terms of the players' mutual beliefs about the basic, objective issues of possible uncertainty, which is equivalent to the existence of a common prior.

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