PROTECT in the Ports of Boston, New York and Beyond: Experiences in Deploying Stackelberg Security Games with Quantal Response
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Bo An | Rong Yang | Milind Tambe | Craig Baldwin | Joseph DiRenzo | Kathryn Moretti | Ben Maule | Garrett Meyer | Eric Shieh | Milind Tambe | Bo An | E. Shieh | Rong Yang | C. Baldwin | Joseph DiRenzo | Ben Maule | G. Meyer | Kathryn Moretti
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