PROTECT in the Ports of Boston, New York and Beyond: Experiences in Deploying Stackelberg Security Games with Quantal Response

The global need for security of key infrastructure with limited resources has led to significant interest in research conducted in multiagent systems towards game-theory for real-world security. As reported previously at AAMAS, three applications based on Stackelberg games have been transitioned to real-world deployment. This includes ARMOR, used by the Los Angeles International Airport to randomize checkpoints of roadways and canine patrols [16]; IRIS, which helps the US Federal Air Marshal Service [22] in scheduling air marshals on international flights; and GUARDS [17], which is under evaluation by the US Transportation Security Administration to allocate resources for airport protection. We as a community remain in the early stages of these deployments, and must continue to develop our understanding of core principles of innovative applications of game theory for security.

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