Managing groundwater as a common-pool resource: an Australian case study

Over-appropriation and degradation of groundwater can result from lack of recognition of, and inappropriate arrangements for, managing groundwater as a common-pool resource. An irrigators group in the Lockyer Valley, South-East Queensland, Australia and the Queensland government are currently working together to address over-exploitation of groundwater through a co-management model designed to be nested within the state and national water reform framework. This paper applies Ostrom's design principles for common-pool resource governance to this proposed co-management framework to strengthen the approach.

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