A novel power market clearing model based on the equilibrium principle in microeconomics

Abstract Clean energy dominant and electricity centric is the inevitable trend of the future energy development. Electric power industry has entered into an increasingly competitive era in recent years due to the deregulation of power systems. However, power market should not be fully competitive and need to be regulated strictly to satisfy the safe and reliable operation of power systems. Base on the market equilibrium principle in microeconomics, a novel power market clearing model with limited competition was put forward, in which the limited competition power satisfies the power flow adjustment and the network losses distribution. Further, the free transaction ratio which can be regarded as the measurement of the degree of power market deregulation was analyzed according to the formulated market clearing model. Finally, three case studies were made on the IEEE-30 test system to verify the practicality and efficiency of the method. The results show that different transaction ratio has significant influence on the operation of power systems and the optimal transaction ratio can be determined.

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