论文信息 - Evolution in economic games

Evolution in economic games

Abstract This paper examines the conditions under which evolutionary processes ‘select’ equilibrium strategies of agents or firms. Under plausible dynamics, optimal selection takes place provided that economic agents are small relative to the environment — that is, each such agent has a negligible effect on others' payoffs. However, when this assumption is not met, survival need not imply optimality. Examples in the contexts of bargaining, bidding, and market competition are presented.

Robert G. Hansen | William F. Samuelson | William Samuelson | R. Hansen

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