Divisional versus company-wide focus: The trade-off between allocation of managerial attention and screening of talent

In this paper, we analyze why managers are sometimes induced to maximize local objectives rather than adopt a company-wide perspective. American managers are sometimes criticized in the popular press for adopting a narrow focus, for example, for concentrating on maximizing divisional performance measures rather than pursuing company-wide objectives.1 This concentration, however, is likely to be an optimal response

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