A network ridesharing experiment with sequential choice of transportation mode
暂无分享,去创建一个
Rui Yang | Meng Cheng | Amnon Rapoport | Vincent Mak | Darryl A. Seale | Eyran J. Gisches | Myounghee Moon | A. Rapoport | Vincent Mak | Rui Yang | Meng Cheng | Myounghee Moon
[1] Hervé Moulin,et al. The proportional random allocation of indivisible units , 2002, Soc. Choice Welf..
[2] Itai Arieli,et al. The Logic of Backward Induction , 2012 .
[3] A. Rapoport,et al. Coordination, “Magic,” and Reinforcement Learning in a Market Entry Game , 1998 .
[4] H. Young. Producer Incentives in Cost Allocation , 1985 .
[5] Asuman E. Ozdaglar,et al. Informational Braess' Paradox: The Effect of Information on Traffic Congestion , 2016, Oper. Res..
[6] John Morgan,et al. Network architecture and traffic flows: Experiments on the Pigou-Knight-Downs and Braess Paradoxes , 2007, Games Econ. Behav..
[7] Vincent Mak,et al. "Pay What You Want" as Threshold Public Good Provision , 2015 .
[8] H. Young. Chapter 34 Cost allocation , 1994 .
[9] Martin Hoefer,et al. Strategic cooperation in cost sharing games , 2010, Int. J. Game Theory.
[10] Jacob K. Goeree,et al. An experimental study of costly coordination , 2005, Games Econ. Behav..
[11] Amnon Rapoport,et al. Distributed Decisions in Networks: Laboratory Study of Routing Splittable Flow , 2014 .
[12] Eyran J. Gisches,et al. Degrading network capacity may improve performance: private versus public monitoring in the Braess Paradox , 2012 .
[13] Amnon Rapoport,et al. Cost-sharing in directed networks: experimental study of equilibrium choice and system dynamics , 2015 .
[14] Thomas S. Ferguson,et al. Who Solved the Secretary Problem , 1989 .
[15] T. Schelling,et al. The Strategy of Conflict. , 1961 .
[16] L. Lambertini. Game Theory in the Social Sciences , 2011 .
[17] Amnon Rapoport,et al. Elicitation of Strategy Profiles in Large Group Coordination Games , 2000 .
[18] Amnon Rapoport,et al. Navigating congested networks with variable demand: Experimental evidence , 2006 .
[19] H. Peyton Young,et al. Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation , 1998 .
[20] Eyran J. Gisches,et al. Degrading network capacity may improve performance: information effects in the Braess Paradox , 2010, BQGT.
[21] Tim Roughgarden,et al. Designing Network Protocols for Good Equilibria , 2010, SIAM J. Comput..
[22] S. M. Samuels,et al. Optimal selection based on relative rank (the “secretary problem”) , 1964 .
[23] K. Jain,et al. Cost Sharing , 2022 .
[24] S. M. Samuels,et al. The Finite-Memory Secretary Problem , 1977 .
[25] Fernando Ordóñez,et al. Ridesharing: The state-of-the-art and future directions , 2013 .
[26] Tim Roughgarden,et al. The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation , 2004, 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.
[27] Martin W. P. Savelsbergh,et al. Optimization for dynamic ride-sharing: A review , 2012, Eur. J. Oper. Res..
[28] Thomas Pitz,et al. Experiments and Simulations on Day-to-Day Route Choice-Behaviour , 2003, SSRN Electronic Journal.
[29] Vasilis Syrgkanis,et al. The Complexity of Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games , 2010, WINE.
[30] J. Huyck,et al. Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure , 1990 .
[31] J. Huyck,et al. Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games , 1991 .
[32] V. Crawford. Adaptive dynamics in coordination games , 1995 .
[33] Matthias Sutter,et al. Experimental Games on Networks: Underpinnings of Behavior and Equilibrium Selection , 2014, SSRN Electronic Journal.
[34] Amnon Rapoport,et al. Choice of Routes in Congested Traffic Networks: Experimental Tests of the Braess Paradox , 2005, Games Econ. Behav..
[35] Gilbert Laporte,et al. Dynamic pickup and delivery problems , 2010, Eur. J. Oper. Res..
[36] Yan Chen,et al. The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection , 2011 .