An experimental analysis of multi-attribute auctions

Abstract Auctions are a fundamental mechanism to automating negotiations in electronic commerce. We investigate multi-attribute auctions, an economic mechanism, which automates negotiation on multiple attributes of a deal. In this approach, we combine decision analysis techniques and single-sided auction mechanisms in order to procure goods and services. The paper describes an experimental analysis of multi-attribute auctions. First, we will provide an overview of the preliminary game-theoretical and simulation results. Then we will introduce a Web-based implementation of the mechanism and describe the design and the results of an experiment analyzing the economic behavior of multi-attribute auction formats. In the experiment, the utility scores achieved in multi-attribute auctions were significantly higher than those of single-attribute auctions. The efficiency was similar in single-attribute and multi-attribute auctions, and we did not find evidence for revenue equivalence between the multi-attribute auction formats.

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