论文信息 - The Complexity of Eliminating Dominated Strategies

The Complexity of Eliminating Dominated Strategies

This paper deals with the computational complexity of some yes/no problems associated with sequential elimination of strategies using three domination relations: strong domination (strict inequalities), weak domination (weak inequalities), and domination (the asymmetric part of weak domination). Classification of various problems as polynomial or NP-complete seems to suggest that strong domination is a simple notion, whereas weak domination and domination are complicated ones.

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