T-Chain: A General Incentive Scheme for Cooperative Computing

In this paper, we propose a simple, distributed, but highly efficient fairness-enforcing incentive mechanism for cooperative computing. The proposed incentive scheme, called Triangle Chaining (T-Chain), enforces reciprocity to minimize the exploitable aspects of other schemes that allow free-riding. In T-Chain, symmetric key cryptography provides the basis for a lightweight, almost-fair exchange protocol, which is coupled with a pay-it-forward mechanism. This combination increases the opportunity for multi-lateral exchanges and further maximizes the resource utilization of participants, each of whom is assumed to operate solely for his or her own benefit. T-Chain also provides barrier-free entry to newcomers with flexible resource allocation, providing them with immediate benefits, and therefore is suitable for dynamic environments with high churn (i.e., Turnover). TChain is distributed and simple to implement, as no trusted third party is required to monitor or enforce the scheme, nor is there any reliance on reputation information or tokens.

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