论文信息 - Signaling Game Model of Safety Management on Construction

Signaling Game Model of Safety Management on Construction

Our paper explores the association between Supervisors and construction enterprises in construction Safety supervision. Specifically, the behaviors between supervisor and construction enterprise were analyzed by using the game theory. Then related factors influencing construction safety were identified, dynamic signaling game is studied. Based on the multi-hierarchy organization analysis, a signaling game‐theoretic model was developed to inspect collusion and incentive mechanism on construction safety. Related proposals were put forward (Ahmed and Hegazi 2005).

Hong Ren | Fei Xu | H. Ren | Fei Xu

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