Rejoinder to “Comment” by Jack Citrin: Political Discontent or Ritualism?

In 1958 only 22 per cent of the total population felt that they could not "trust the government in Washington to do what is right" all or most of the time. By the fall of 1972 that figure had climbed to 45 per cent. Furthermore, the percentage of eligible voters participating in the 1972 presidential election was the lowest it has been since 1948; crises and scandals have continually plagued the government since the Watergate revelations; and the economic conditions of the country have provoked widespread uncertainty and anxiety among the populace. There is good reason, then, for the intense current interest in attitudes of political disaffection and alienation. Present U.S. conditions demonstrate that political alienation is a phenomenon of fundamental significance in political processes. Feelings of political cynicism and alienation may substantially diminish the willingness of citizens to participate in politics or to support programs directed at resolving the social problems that stimulate discontent. Attitudes of political alienation have likewise been related to public demands for radical political reforms during trying periods of social or economic discontent. Alienation and non-participation, however, go beyond just questions of voluntary compliance with policies or the possibilities for radical change; they strike at a very basic democratic norm. Democratic theory emphasizes voluntary consent as the basis of political obligation and legitimacy. Democratic government assumes-indeed, requires-widespread participation, political equality, the accountability of leaders and protection of the individual citizen's constitutional guarantees. The full attainment of these values is only possible when the relationship between the leaders and the public is based on mutual understanding and reciprocal trust rather than on the use of coercive and arbitrary authority. Political distrust has varying significance for different political systems. Distrust obviously has other implications in a two-hundred-year-old democracy than it would in a dictatorship that has been in existence for only a brief period. Because of these differences a concern with questions of legitimacy in the United States seems more reasonable when focused on satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the implementation of values rather than on the acceptance or rejection of those values. Distrust of government in the U.S. may, for some, be associated with the partisan hopes of "voting the rascals out;" for others, it may indicate a sense of enduring inequities in government decisions and outputs. It does not, therefore, necessarily imply a desire for a completely different form of government-although for some it may mean exactly this. These varying "foci" of distrust may be conceptualized as a continuum incorporating distrust of the leaders, various institutions, political processes, and democratic values. The behavioral consequences of political disaffection may be expected to divaricate from apathy to participation in reform or protest behaviors, depending on the efficacy and social conditions of the population subgroups under investigation. Likewise, we can expect the several causes or correlates of a complex attitude such as trust in government to be affected by sociological and historical circumstances. Because of these complexities it is understandable that Professor Citrin should raise, in his "Comment," questions about the meaning, behavioral consequences, and political correlates of trust in government. A number of conclusions that his discussion leads to are, however, inconsistent with the data, and more importantly, hold disturbing implications for the relevance of empirical political research as social commentary. These inconsistencies, problems of interpretations and the questions raised in the "Comment" can best be explicated by a further discussion of the three major points of the "Comment."