Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] E. Kalai. Large Robust Games , 2004 .
[2] Hans Peters,et al. Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems , 2004, Games Econ. Behav..
[3] John A. Weymark,et al. Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees , 2003, J. Econ. Theory.
[4] Mark Satterthwaite,et al. Strategy-proofness and markets , 2001, Soc. Choice Welf..
[5] Salvador Barberà,et al. An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions , 2001, Soc. Choice Welf..
[6] Jeroen M. Swinkels. Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions , 2001 .
[7] David A. Smith. Manipulability measures of common social choice functions , 1999 .
[8] P. Hammond,et al. Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange , 1998 .
[9] John Duggan. Virtual Bayesian Implementation , 1997 .
[10] J. Schummer. Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies , 1996 .
[11] Luis C. Corchón,et al. On the generic impossibility of truthful behavior: A simple approach , 1995 .
[12] J. Laffont. Advances in Economic Theory , 1995 .
[13] M. Jackson,et al. Strategy-Proof Exchange , 1995 .
[14] D. Saari. Basic Geometry of Voting , 1995 .
[15] Steven R. Williams,et al. Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information , 1994 .
[16] J. Kelly. Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't , 1993 .
[17] Hitoshi Matsushima,et al. Virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies: complete information , 1992 .
[18] J. Laffont,et al. Implementation, Contracts, and Renegotiation in Environments With Complete Information , 1992 .
[19] Lin Zhou. Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies , 1991 .
[20] B. Peleg,et al. Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences , 1990 .
[21] L. Hurwicz. On informationally decentralized systems , 1977 .
[22] D. J. Roberts,et al. THE INCENTIVES FOR PRICE-TAKING BEHAVIOR IN LARGE EXCHANGE ECONOMIES , 1976 .