Game theoretic analysis of cooperation enforcement in mobile ad hoc networks

This paper focuses on the formal assessment of the properties of cooperation enforcement mechanisms used to detect and prevent selfish behavior of nodes forming a mobile ad hoc network. Taking as a reference the CORE mechanism introduced in [9], we present two alternative approaches based on game theory that provide a powerful analytical method to study cooperation between self-interested players. We demonstrate that the formation of large coalitions of cooperating nodes is possible only when a mechanism like CORE is implemented in each node. Game theory also provides further insight to features of CORE such as the convergence speed to a cooperative behavior.

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